The Immutable Past · What Is
What Is a Requirement
A requirement is usually read as a piece of the outcome: meet them all and the rest should follow. Derived from the foundation’s definition of a condition, at the clause no piece has yet taken as its subject, the word turns out to say what an outcome needs and nothing about what it will yield — so a requirement, on its own, can decide an outcome in one direction only.
The half of a familiar phrase that rarely makes it onto the list
necessary ≠ sufficient
Most people can say the phrase. Very few requirements lists are read by it.
Logicians have kept the two words apart for a long time. A necessary condition is one without which a thing does not occur; a sufficient condition is one with which it does. The foundation’s definition of a condition contains the first word and not the second — a prerequisite is required — and this piece follows what that omission does to an ordinary word.
Contents
- A requirement, stated fairly
- The neighbours
- Three cases the picture cannot hold
- What the definition says, and what it leaves out
- One direction only
- The list is a naming
- What meeting a requirement is
- What it costs
- An ordinary Tuesday
The word comes stapled to things we want. Entry requirements. Minimum requirements. The requirements for the role. Meets all requirements. By the time most of us are grown we have met hundreds of them — a grade for a course, a signature on a form, a birth certificate for a passport, a qualifying time for a race — and we have learned to read them in a particular way.
The way is a checklist. Somebody who knows what an outcome takes writes it down; you work down the list; each tick brings the outcome a little closer; the last tick delivers it, or ought to. On this picture a requirement is a portion of the outcome — a share of it, handed over in advance — and a completed list is something close to a claim on the rest. That is why I met every requirement comes so easily after a refusal, and why it is said with such conviction. It is heard as an argument that the refusal was a mistake.
The picture is not naive. Lists written by people who know the work are useful, and they are right about a great deal. So it is worth asking what the word itself says. Not whether any list is fair, and not what belongs on one. What a requirement is.
The neighbours
Three earlier pieces sit close enough that the difference should be stated first. The piece on opportunity took apart the idea that a condition does something to an outcome — that it happens, or causes, or makes possible — and this piece takes all three denials as read rather than running them again. The piece on technicalities showed that a requirement which decided an outcome cannot have been idle; it stayed with a single rule and with procedure. This one stays with the prerequisite rather than with any rule that lists it, and asks the question that piece left alone: what a requirement decides when it is met. And the piece on discovery used the definition of a condition only as the ground of a naming. Here the definition is the subject.
Three cases the picture cannot hold
Put the checklist against three ordinary cases.
Case one · the counter
Flour, water, salt, yeast, and an oven at temperature. Every requirement of a loaf is on the counter, weighed and on time. The baker goes out for an hour. When she comes back there is no bread — and not a fraction of bread in proportion to the ticks. Nobody is puzzled. Everybody knows that ingredients are what a loaf needs and not what makes one. It is a lesson we learn in the kitchen and seldom carry anywhere else.
Case two · the course
A student needs the first calculus course before she may enrol in the second. She passes the first, enrols in the second, and fails it. The catalogue called the first course a prerequisite, and it was exactly that: without it she could not have sat in the room. With it, she sat in the room. The catalogue never said more, and nobody reading it thought it had. Yet when the same shape turns up somewhere that matters more to us, we read the list differently.
Case three · the advertisement
A job is advertised with seven requirements. An applicant meets all seven, can document each one, and is not called for interview. I met every requirement, she says, and she is right. What is less clear is what the sentence was meant to prove. Many other applicants met all seven as well. The seven were never a description of whom the employer would hire. They were a description of whom the employer would not consider without.
The seam is the same in all three. Each requirement was met, and the outcome did not come with it. And in each case the checklist picture comes with a reply: then the list was incomplete — there must have been another requirement, unwritten, that was not met. Sometimes that reply is right. It is worth noticing that the picture depends on it being right in every case, which is a much stronger claim, and one we will come back to.
Figure 01
What “I met every requirement” is carrying, and whose each part is
| In the sentence | Whose it is | What the foundation lets it say |
|---|---|---|
| The requirement | Nobody’s | The name of a prerequisite — something the outcome needs. It says nothing about what the outcome will get. |
| The list | Its writer’s | A finite naming of such prerequisites. Not an inventory of everything the outcome rests on, and not able to become one. |
| The meeting | Yours | A mark — the transcript, the certificate, the recorded time — read against a named condition. Dated, permanent, and answered for by the person who made it. |
| The outcome | In none of the three | The definition gives the first row nothing to yield it from, the second row cannot certify that nothing else was needed, and the third row is a fact about marks. |
What the definition says, and what it leaves out
I work from a small set of numbered primitives and the results derived from them. One primitive does most of the work today, and it is the plainest sentence in the foundation. A condition is a prerequisite in order for something to happen or exist (P6). The same primitive then denies a condition three things: it does not cause, it does not make possible, and it does not happen. Earlier pieces in this series have worked those denials hard. This one takes the clause they are attached to.
Read that clause for its direction. It is written from the outcome’s side. It says what the outcome needs: for this to happen or exist, that is required. It says nothing, either way, about what the condition supplies. Required is the whole of its positive content. A requirement, in ordinary English, is the name of such a prerequisite; named, a condition is an idea (P7), and that is all the word adds.
Now set the logician’s two words against it. Necessary: without it, the outcome does not happen or exist. That is simply what prerequisite means, so the definition contains it. Sufficient: with it, the outcome does. The definition does not contain that. And the two ways ordinary speech usually slips it in are exactly two of the three the definition denies — that the condition causes the outcome, and that it makes the outcome possible, in the sense of a door held open or a permission granted. Take both away and there is nothing left in the definition from which a met requirement could produce the thing it is a requirement for, or promise it.
Marked construction 01 — consequence, not doctrine
A requirement names a prerequisite, and a prerequisite is required, not productive. The definition contains necessity and contains nothing from which sufficiency could follow. So meeting a requirement is not a share of the outcome, not a down payment on it, and not a claim to it — and a requirement, on its own, can decide an outcome only by being unmet.
Grounds. P6 at its positive clause, with two of its denials — that a condition causes, and that it makes possible; P7 for a requirement as a named condition. The construction is the reading of the ordinary logical distinction against the definition, and the observation that the clause has content only on the side where the prerequisite is absent. It says nothing about what, beyond its prerequisites, an outcome rests on. The foundation does not say, and neither does this piece.
One question should be settled before going further, because the checklist assumes the answer. Does one outcome have several prerequisites? The bread says so, and most lists say so. The primitives neither say it nor forbid it. The definition speaks of a prerequisite, one at a time, and nothing in it restricts an outcome to one; the circumference on which conditions sit is not closed by any enumeration (S1). That permits many prerequisites for one outcome. It does not prove that any particular outcome has more than one, and the argument here does not need it to. The construction above holds for a single requirement. The next two hold for a list of one.
One direction only
Go back to the piece on technicalities with the construction in hand. Every case in it — the search without a warrant, the will with one witness, the passport a day out of date — was a requirement unmet. That was not an accident of selection. It is the only way a requirement, by itself, decides anything.
Follow the definition both ways. Unmet: the outcome rested on the prerequisite, the prerequisite is absent, and the outcome does not happen or exist. That is not the requirement doing something — the piece on opportunity settled that a missing prerequisite is an absence, not an obstacle pushing back — it is what prerequisite means. Met: the definition has no clause to apply. It is silent. So the only verdict a requirement can return by itself is no.
- Unmet The outcome, which rested on it, does not happen. The requirement decided. This is where every technicality lives. A verdict: no.
- Met The definition has nothing to say. The requirement decided nothing on its own. Whatever happens next is not settled by this. No verdict. Not yes.
- Not on the list The list cannot say whether it is there. A list is a naming. See the next section. Unknown to the list.
This is not a claim that met requirements do not matter. They matter in exactly the way the definition says: without them there would have been nothing further to decide. The student who passed the first course was in the room for the second. That is not small. It is just not the second course.
A gate can be believed when it says no. It has not said yes when it lets you through.
The list is a naming
Now the reply that comes with the checklist. When every listed requirement is met and the outcome does not follow, people holding the picture conclude that the list was missing something. That conclusion may be true on a given day. What cannot be true is the assumption underneath it: that a complete list was there to be written, and that a careful enough writer would have written it.
Every condition is a point on one circumference, and the circumference is infinite; no enumeration closes it (S1). The foundation keeps two words apart here and does not let them trade places. Conditions are nameable without limit. The conditions named at any moment are finite. A requirements list is a set of named conditions. It is a naming, not an inventory — which is as true of a list of seven as of a list of one.
Marked construction 02 — consequence, not doctrine
A requirements list is a finite naming of prerequisites. Being a list, it cannot certify that the outcome rests on nothing it does not name. So “I met every requirement” is true of the named ones and says nothing about the rest — and “then the list was incomplete” is sometimes a finding and never a guarantee.
Grounds. S1, with the locked distinction between named and nameable, applied to a list; P7 for a listed requirement as a named condition. The construction is the application. It does not say that any given list is missing anything. It says the list cannot be the evidence that it is not.
Notice that this cuts toward the writer of the list as much as toward the reader. Whoever writes meet these and you are in is promising more than a list can hold. Whoever writes without these we cannot consider you is promising exactly what a list can.
What meeting a requirement is
When you meet a requirement, what is it, exactly, that meets it? Not the outcome, and not you in general. Something made: the transcript, the certificate, the qualifying time as recorded, the dough on the counter, the form with both signatures. The foundation has a locked word for these — an artifact, an imperfect historical mark made in relation to an exemplar. Meeting a requirement is a mark read against a named condition. Meets is the verdict of that reading.
Three things follow, and they are the part of the word worth keeping.
The meeting is yours in a way the requirement never was. The requirement names a condition, and a condition belongs to nobody. The mark was made by someone, and the person is the site of conscious responsibility for it (R13).
The meeting is permanent. Records update expectation forward and never re-open (R2). A qualification met on a date stays met on that date, whatever happens to the application it went into. A refusal adds a record beside it. It does not reach back and un-meet anything.
And the disappointment has an address. A requirements list is usually read by two people at once, and both of them are forecasting. The writer of an advertisement is predicting what the work will need — in the foundation’s terms, an entry in the writer’s expectation, the denominator of R = A/E (P4). That is worth a sentence and no more; it is a forecast and should be read as one. The reader is predicting something else: that meeting the list will be enough. That second forecast is the checklist picture, and it is the one the first construction removes. When the refusal comes, what the applicant meets is neither the refusal alone nor the forecast alone but the quotient of the two (R8) — a surprise, felt, and below what was expected. That surprise is not evidence that the marks were read wrongly. It measures how much sufficiency was expected from a list that only ever named necessities.
Marked construction 03 — consequence, not doctrine
“I met every requirement” is a true sentence about marks read against named conditions. It cannot show that the outcome was owed, because the definition gives a condition nothing to owe it from; it cannot show that the list was complete, because a list is a naming. What it does establish is permanent, and it is yours.
Grounds. The locked definition of an artifact for the meeting as a mark; R2 for its permanence in the record; R13 for whose it is; P4 and R8 for the disappointment as the host’s quotient; with constructions 01 and 02. The construction is the sorting of the sentence into what it is true of and what it cannot reach.
What it costs
Three costs, and each takes away something people lean on.
“I did everything right” stops being a claim. It remains a true report, often a creditable one. It stops being an argument that the outcome was due. Doing everything required can end in nothing, and nothing in the foundation says otherwise or says that it will be made up somewhere else. That is bleak, and it should be said plainly rather than softened.
The checklist loses its sense of progress. Ticks feel like distance covered toward the outcome. They are distance covered in marks — made, dated, yours — and not a fraction of the thing on the far side. People who organise their lives by lists will feel this one.
The gatekeeper loses a shelter too. A person who writes requirements cannot say anyone who meets these will, and cannot answer a disappointed applicant with you met the list, so the list was not the problem as though that closed the matter. The list was a naming. Whatever the decision rested on beyond it belongs to the people who made the decision, and they answer for that mark as the applicant answers for hers.
If you met every requirement and were still turned down
If you are reading this after a refusal — a job, a place on a course, a promotion, a visa — nothing here says the refusal was fair, and nothing here says it was unfair. The piece is about what a requirement is, not about whether any particular decision was right, and some decisions are wrong. It is not telling you that your disappointment is a logical mistake. The disappointment is the honest measure of what you were hoping for, and you were hoping for something that mattered.
What the piece can add is small. The marks you made are yours and they stay met. Understanding why a list could not promise the outcome does not make the refusal hurt less, and there is no schedule for when it should stop. If it has become something you keep replaying, a better argument is not the next step; a person you trust, or a professional, is.
An ordinary Tuesday
- Read every requirement as “needed for”, not “enough for”. Then ask the second question the list cannot answer: what else does this rest on?
- When you have met them all, say “I qualify”, not “I’m owed”. And plan for the no before it comes, because the list was never in a position to rule it out.
- When you write requirements for other people, write only what a list can hold. Without these we cannot consider you is true. With these you are in usually is not, and saying it costs someone later.
- Judge the preparation by the requirement, not by the result. The evaluative question for a mark is fidelity, not success (R11): did the transcript, the portfolio, the time meet the condition it was made toward? That question has an answer on the day, and the answer does not change when the letter comes.
- Revise the reading, not the record. What is yours to change is your response to a readable condition (P5) — here, the habit of reading a list as a promise. The marks already made stay made.
A requirement tells you what an outcome cannot happen without. It has never told you whether the outcome will follow once you have it. Meet it well, keep the mark, and do not ask the list for a promise it was not built to hold.
Held open
- What, beyond its prerequisites, an outcome rests on.
- The foundation defines a condition and says what it is not. It does not name what suffices for an outcome, and this piece rests on that silence rather than filling it: the first construction depends only on sufficiency being absent from the definition. If the foundation ever says what suffices, this piece would need a note. Not supplied.
- “Minimum requirements” and “only just met”.
- The ordinary word carries degrees — a minimum, a margin, a pass by a whisker. Those are properties of the reading of marks, and a threshold somebody set. Whether conditioning itself carries a degree is held open in the foundation, and this piece does not grade it either way. Named, not filled.